t. 1. Des erreurs et de la vérité.--Ode sur l'origine.--Stances sur l'origine.

For several centuries prior to the founding of the Theosophical Society in 1875, individual 'theosophers' in Britain and Europe were quietly in touch with one another all seekers of the inward way. Theosophic Correspondence (1792 1797) is a series of inspiring letters, personal and philosophic, exchanged during the climactic days of the French Revolution between Kirchberger, member of the Sovereign Council at Berne, Switzerland, and Saint-Martin, whom Kirchberger regarded as 'the most eminent writer . . . and most profound (...) of his age'. (shrink)

Sarah is a young deaf woman in revolt, refusing to speak. She marries James, an orthophonist who works in a special school for the deaf. However, what gradually emerges in the course of their relationship is the latent suffering caused by what each of the partners isn't getting. James, tired of acting as Sarah's interpreter, frustrated by the limits of what they can share, shouts out:You want to be independent of me, you want to be a person in your own (...) right, you want people not to pity you … then you [must] learn to read my lips and you [must] learn to use that little mouth of yours for something besides eating and showing me you're better than hearing girls in bed! Come on! Read my lips? What am I saying? Say what I'm saying … You always have to be dependent on someone, and you always will for the rest of your life until you learn to speak. Now come on! I want you to speak to me. Let me hear it. Speak! Speak! Speak! …. (shrink)

Sarah is a young deaf woman in revolt, refusing to speak. She marries James, an orthophonist who works in a special school for the deaf. However, what gradually emerges in the course of their relationship is the latent suffering caused by what each of the partners isn't getting. James, tired of acting as Sarah's interpreter, frustrated by the limits of what they can share, shouts out:You want to be independent of me, you want to be a person in your own (...) right, you want people not to pity you … then you [must] learn to read my lips and you [must] learn to use that little mouth of yours for something besides eating and showing me you're better than hearing girls in bed! Come on! Read my lips? What am I saying? Say what I'm saying … You always have to be dependent on someone, and you always will for the rest of your life until you learn to speak. Now come on! I want you to speak to me. Let me hear it. Speak! Speak! Speak! …. (shrink)

Comment évolue depuis quelques années la démocratie en Occident? C’est au fond à cette question essentielle que sont consacrés les textes proposés ici par la section « Vie politique ». Même si la mort de Ben Laden, en mai dernier, a pu laisser penser que l’Amérique d’Obama avait retrouvé une certaine confiance en elle, le berceau de la démocratie n’en est pas...

Le succès européen de l’enquête de Roberto Saviano, Gomorra, sur les ramifications internationales de la Camorra napolitaine, a rappelé combien le phénomène mafieux dépasse largement le Mezzogiorno italien1. Quelque peu négligée depuis la fin des grandes tueries de Palerme au début des années 1990, la mafia ou toute forme de criminalité organisée...

Is ecological anxiety—sometimes called eco-anxiety—just a paralyzing affect, or can it lead to an ethical and political commitment? At first glance, it seems that this anxiety implies, by definition, a lack of knowledge, and must therefore be overcome in order to live better and be able to act again. However, I wish to argue in this article that ecological anxiety, when it is a fear for the future, is not a pathology to be rid of, but a valuable awareness. Indeed, (...) in a period of social and environmental disasters on a global scale, this affect is above all indicative of a concern for the world. The question that then arises is that of the effectiveness of practical wisdom, in the sense of Aristotelian φρόνησις [phronesis], in deliberating on issues as complex as global warming. However, it seems necessary, to overcome the paralysing anxiety, to return to the sources of a collective practical wisdom that could enable citizens to reappropriate issues that concern them directly. (shrink)

Merleau-Ponty s’est toujours intéressé aux rapports complexes entre christianisme, philosophie et théologie. Ses écrits, publiés ou inédits, opposent régulièrement « la nouveauté du christianisme » – comme expérience de l’homme, comme attitude religieuse, et jusque dans sa conception de Dieu – à une théologie dite « explicative », qui ne parviendrait pas à penser cette nouveauté, voire la trahirait. Accusée d’importer le Dieu des philosophes, cette théologie expliquerait Dieu et expliquerait par Dieu pour mieux se passer des mystères de l’homme, (...) des dimensions tragiques de sa condition, manquant ainsi paradoxalement une négativité qui est le lieu même où s’ouvre l’attitude religieuse. Dans cette confrontation originale, Merleau-Ponty transpose sa propre lutte contre certains philosophes et mobilise les axes essentiels de sa pensée : ses conceptions de l’homme et de l’être, une anthropologie de la chair perceptive et désirante, une ontologie de l’être inachevé et inépuisable. Merleau-Ponty was always interested in the complex relationship between christianity, philosophy and theology. His writings, published or unpublished, regularly contrast « the novelty of Christianity » — as experience of man, as religious attitude, and including its conception of God — with a so-called « explanatory » theology, which would not manage to think this novelty, might even betray it. Charged with importing the God of the philosophers, this theology would explain God and explain by God in order to bypass the mysteries of man, the tragic dimensions of its condition, thus paradoxically missing a negativity which is the very place where the religious attitude unfolds. In this original confrontation, Merleau-Ponty transposes his own fight against some philosophers and summons the essential axis of his thought : his conceptions of man and being, an anthropology of perceptive and desiring flesh, an ontology of unfinished and inexhaustible being. (shrink)

La série Hippocrate place au cœur de son récit de jeunes internes en médecine qui se découvrent tout aussi vulnérables que compétents. Parmi les séries médicales, Hippocrate développe donc une critique de la faculté de soigner de jeunes médecins, pris au piège d’un hôpital public malade de ses contradictions. Regarder Hippocrate revient ainsi à affronter la question : quelle société pour prendre soin de ceux qui prennent soin de nous?

Le 9 novembre 1989, le mur de Berlin s’effondrait sous les applaudissements de la communauté mondiale, rêvant d’une « fin de l’histoire », un monde ouvert et sans frontières1. Moins de vingt ans après cet événement, le Congrès des États-Unis d’Amérique votait le 15 décembre 2005 la loi no 6061 autorisant la construction d’un mur long de plus de 1 000 km pour protéger..

Avec l’article 4 de la loi du 23 février 2005 rappelant « le rôle positif de la présence française outre-mer », les pouvoirs publics pourront au moins se flatter d’une chose : jamais depuis de longues années, un texte législatif n’aura suscité autant de débats au sein de la communauté des historiens, d’ordinaire plutôt discrète. Quatre pétitions contradictoires, de multiples tribunes dans la presse, deux missions sinon concurrentes, du moins parallèles, tout cela pour tenter de résoudre une crise lancée par (...) un amendement parlementaire ! (shrink)

Peut-être l’un des mots les plus forts pour résumer les politiques mises en place pour combattre la crise du subprime aura-t-il été celui prêté à l’ancien dirigeant Mikhaël Gorbatchev. Analysant en 2008 cette profusion d’interventions publiques pour sauver des grandes banques en faillite, tandis qu’on laissait les surendettés se faire expulser..

Présente le parcours philosophique de Merleau-Ponty tant dans sa formation que dans ses objectifs. Ses références : Descartes, Leibniz, Gabriel Marcel. Ses concepts opératoires : le concret, l'incarnation, l'intentionnalité, les chiasmes.

Nous étudions ici l’une des figures les plus originales et les plus complexes de l’univers du dernier Merleau-Ponty, l’une des moins bien comprises aussi : la « promiscuité ». Aussi polymorphe que la célèbre figure de l’«empiétement », la «promiscuité » appartient en propre au complexe de la psychanalyse ontologique de Merleau-Ponty. Elle décrit d’abord la logique des rapports archaïques avec autrui, et se situe en cela dans la ligne du travail sur l’intercorporéité. Elle désigne aussi la modalité connaissante de (...) la chair, tout en indiquant notre résistance à celle-ci, notre ignorance naturelle de la chair comme être de promiscuité. Elle habite bientôt le cœur de la conception merleau-pontienne de l’inconscient, dans le prolongement des travaux de Paul Schilder sur l’image du corps. Enfin, elle vient renouveler dans les derniers manuscrits l’idée même de mystère ontologique. La chair, être de promiscuité, vit dans la promiscuité de l’être. Et la philosophie, d’après Merleau-Ponty, devrait être le savoir cohérent des visages apparemment si divers de cette ultime figure du lien. (shrink)

À chaque décennie, l’anniversaire de Mai 68 apporte son lot de confusion supplémentaire à qui veut tenter de donner un sens à l’événement1. Le quarantième anniversaire ne change rien à la chose, même si Mai, faisant désormais parti du paysage historique et mémoriel, donne naissance à un réexamen historiographique plus conséquent2. Pourtant, à quelques rares exceptions, cette..

Comment évolue depuis quelques années la démocratie en Occident ? C’est au fond à cette question essentielle que sont consacrés les textes proposés ici par la section « Vie politique ». Même si la mort de Ben Laden, en mai dernier, a pu laisser penser que l’Amérique d’Obama avait retrouvé une certaine confiance en elle, le berceau de la démocratie n’en est pas..

“To see is to imagine. And to imagine, is to see.”Perception and Imaginary in Merleau-PontyMerleau-Ponty accords such a phenomenological and ontological priority to perception that this privilege might lead him to minimize the importance of theimaginary in our relationship with the world. In fact, in the work published during his life, the theme of the imaginary does not occupy a large place, and its conceptual elaboration remains little visible. A reading of his posthumous publications and of his unpublished papers leads (...) to a more subtle landscape, inwhich the philosopher destabilizes our common oppositions between real and imaginary, as well as those between the imaginary and truth. From themanuscripts from the end of the 1940s on, Merleau-Ponty expands his inquiry into perception in two complementary directions: the intuition of a form of coextensivity between perceptive life and imaginary life, but also between perception and expression. These intuitions, never disavowed, would continueto deepen up through the late unpublished ontological works. They find a guiding thread in the contestation of Sartre’s separation between the real andthe imaginary, and they open out onto the outline of a complex link between truth, imagination, and expression. Merleau-Ponty pretended to approve of thework of The Imaginary all that which is actually moving beyond it, in the direction most opposite to this essay’s own aims: “To see is to imagine. And toimagine is to see.” This split with Sartre finds one of its pivots in the phenomenological characterization of vision as a surpassing of the observable, a surpassing that would touch on an essential dimension of being and of truth.“Vedere è immaginare. E immaginare, è vedere”.Percezione e immaginario in Merleau-PontyMerleau-Ponty accorda alla percezione una tale priorità, fenomenologica e ontologica, che questo privilegio potrebbe condurre a minimizzare l’importanzadell’immaginario nel nostro rapporto al mondo. Di fatto, nell’opera pubblicata in vita, il tema dell’immaginario non occupa un grande spazio, e la suaelaborazione concettuale resta poco visibile. La lettura delle pubblicazioni postume e degli inediti conduce a un disegno più sottile, che vede il filosofo destabilizzare le nostre comuni opposizioni fra reale e immaginario così come quelle fra immaginario e verità. A partire dai manoscritti della fine degli anniQuaranta, Merleau-Ponty allarga la sua indagine sulla percezione in due direzioni complementari: verso l’intuizione di una forma di co-estensività fravita percettiva e vita immaginaria, ma altresì fra percezione e espressione. Mai smentite, queste intuizioni vanno approfondendosi fino ai tardi inediti“ontologici”. Esse trovano un filo conduttore nella messa in causa della separazione operata da Sartre fra reale e immaginario, e sfociano nell’abbozzodi un legame complesso fra verità, immaginario e espressione. Merleau-Ponty finge di “ratificare” il lavoro de L’Immaginario, in realtà sorpassandolo nelladirezione il più possibile opposta allo sforzo compiuto da questo stesso saggio: «edere è immaginare. E immaginare è vedere». Questo distanziarsi da Sartretrova uno dei suoi “cardini” nella caratterizzazione fenomenologica della visione come superamento dell’osservabile, un superamento che riguarderebbeuna dimensione essenziale dell’essere come della verità. (shrink)

It is a commonly held assumption among cultural, social, and political psychologists that imagining the future of societies we live in has the potential to change how we think and act in the world. However little research has been devoted to whether this effect exists in collective imaginations, of social groups, communities and nations, for instance. This book explores the part that imagination and creativity play in the construction of collective futures, and the diversity of outlets in which these are (...) presented, from fiction and cultural symbols to science and technology. The authors discuss this effect in social phenomena such as in intergroup conflict and social change, and focus on several cases studies to illustrate how the imagination of collective futures can guide social and political action. This book brings together theoretical and empirical contributions from cultural, social, and political psychology to offer insight into our constant imagination of the societies in which we live. (shrink)

Should we preserve nature or revolt in order to protect “the living” (“le vivant”)? At first sight, this invites a comparison between two ways and means of protecting nature. However, this article will defend the thesis that these two methods of protecting nature do not rest upon the same conception of our position, as human beings, towards the living. Indeed, in the end, we find an underlying opposition between nature, conceived as savage or as radical alterity (often inspired by the (...) culturally loaded notion of wilderness, as found in the politics of preservation of vulnerable natural spaces) and the notion of “the living.” I intend to use the concept of the living in order to emphasize “ordinary nature” and our strong connection with all other living things. This reflection will enable me to defend the connection between the fight for environmental justice (namely revolt or resistance movements on the part of the poorest populations defending their living environment and their resources against an unequal production system) and the struggle for the protection of vulnerable living spaces and species. (shrink)